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Abstract 
Observers have classified the European Union (EU) as reluctant in its implementation of the “Responsibility to Protect” 
(R2P) (Task Force on the EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities, 2013). This contribution revisits that argument by employing 
a more nuanced interpretation of norm implementation than the binary conceptualisation typically applied. By apprais-
ing EU reactions to the 2011 Libyan crisis, we investigate whether a “European practice of mass atrocity prevention” is 
emerging and if so how this relates—or not—to R2P. We do this by investigating EU practices seeking to protect people 
from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity—paying particular attention to the three pil-
lars and four policy areas included in the R2P framework (ICISS, 2001). Our review of EU responses to Libya seeks to un-
veil whether and if so how EU practice related to mass atrocity prevention in that country rejected, adopted or indeed 
adapted R2P. The enquiry appraises both how R2P mattered to the EU response and how the Libya crisis affected the 
Union’s approach to mass atrocity prevention and within it R2P. In this way, the study asks how norms can change prac-
tice, but also how practice can change norms. As such, our focus is on the inter-relationship between principles and 
practices of protection. 
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1. Introduction 
The “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) is an internation-
ally endorsed yet disputed approach to balancing re-
spect for state sovereignty with the perceived need at 
times to circumvent it to protect people (Bellamy, 
2011). It proposes that states have the primary respon-
sibility to protect their populations (Pillar One), but al-
so that the international community should intervene 
to support (Pillar Two) or—if necessary—take over that 
responsibility (Pillar Three), when a state is unable or 
unwilling to protect its population from genocide, eth-
nic cleansing, war crimes and/or crimes against human-
ity (ICISS, 2001; UN, 2005). From its inception, R2P 
sought to institutionalise these limitations to state sov-
ereignty and thereby pave the way for more effective 
international practices1 of protection, overcoming the 
                                                          
1 In this article we use the term “practices” with reference to 
the so-called “practice turn” in International Relations. We 
therefore define practices as “socially meaningful patterns of 
action, which, in being performed more or less competently, 
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stumbling blocks encountered by the previously pro-
posed principle of “humanitarian intervention”. R2P 
called for a comprehensive reframing of political, eco-
nomic, judicial and only in the last instance military re-
sponses to (expected) mass atrocity situations, 
amounting to what Martin Gilbert called “the most sig-
nificant adjustment to sovereignty in 360 years” (Ev-
ans, 2011).  
Significant efforts by the norm’s entrepreneurs 
brought about positive responses in several interna-
tional fora, including early endorsement by the United 
Nations (UN) General Assembly and Security Council. 
Nevertheless, R2P remains at an emerging stage and is 
still—perhaps even increasingly—controversial. The 
logic of contestedness (Wiener & Puetter, 2009), which 
has prevailed particularly after NATO’s 2011 interven-
tion in Libya, has affected the very meaning of R2P—to 
its supporters as well as its critics. Among the former, 
some are now framing the norm in a substantially dif-
ferent way; that is, as an agenda to catalyse political 
will to “do something”, but no longer challenging the 
Westphalian state system’s guarding of sovereignty 
first and foremost. For example, since her appointment 
the current UN Special Adviser for R2P, Jennifer Welsh, 
has emphasised the importance of Pillar One and Two 
and downplayed military action under Pillar Three, i.e. 
against the will of the target state (The Stanley Founda-
tion, 2013). Instead she has presented R2P as a state-
centred norm, which may mobilise a “sense of duty” 
towards endangered populations but at the same time 
renews respect for state sovereignty.2 
The starting point for this enquiry is that, as with 
any emerging norm, the meaning of R2P is deemed to 
evolve through practice.3 The content of a norm is 
shaped by “contestation” (Wiener, 2008) but also “im-
plementation” (Betts & Orchard, 2014). This enquiry 
digs deeper into the evolution of R2P by focusing on 
how it is implemented—in part if not necessarily in full. 
The goal is to ascertain how—if at all—R2P relates to 
(changing) practices of protection. To this end, we con-
ceptualise implementation as a non-binary, multi-
faceted and dynamic two-way process, and explore 
                                                                                           
simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background 
knowledge and discourse in and on the material world” (Adler 
& Pouliot, 2011, p. 4). To us, actions seeking to prevent, react 
to or rebuild societies after mass atrocity situations are prac-
tices in this sense.  
2 Jennifer Welsh, statements made at the Civil Society Dialogue 
Network Meeting, “The UN, the EU and the Responsibility to 
Protect: Challenges and Opportunities”, Tuesday 10 March 
2015. 
3 We understand norms as “structures of meaning in use” 
(Wiener, 2009, p. 176) that evolve interactively (Wiener, 2009, 
p. 176) so that “norm erosion rather than the “power” of 
norms will eventually carry the day” (Wiener, 2009, p. 176). 
Such a definition is useful also to understand how “norms” and 
“practices” (as defined earlier) are mutually constitutive.  
how European Union (EU) principles and practices relat-
ed to mass atrocity prevention are evolving, thereby 
perhaps giving R2P a specific meaning in the EU context.  
For a truly comprehensive analysis, one should as-
sess EU implementation of R2P across preventive, reac-
tive and rebuilding policies. Recognising, however, that 
prevention and rebuilding are long-term and structural 
as well as short-term and operational activities, an as-
sessment of such policies towards Libya would require 
a broader evaluation of EU foreign, security and de-
fence as well as neighbourhood, trade, development, 
human rights and conflict prevention policies over a 
much longer period of time. This, unfortunately, goes 
beyond the scope of this contribution. We do, howev-
er, provide a piece of this puzzle in our appraisal of the 
EU’s reactive policies, ranging from political and eco-
nomic interventions to military responses to human 
security challenges in Libya during and shortly after the 
crisis in 2011. 
Libya is an important case in point; first and fore-
most, because of the serious threat the recent crisis 
brought (and still brings) to people in that country. 
Moreover, NATO’s 2011 intervention has been pro-
moted by some as a clear-cut case of successful R2P 
implementation (Evans, 2011), whilst others have ac-
cused it of killing the concept altogether (Rieff, 2011). 
Thus, it is a useful place to start unpacking the all too 
often binary assessment of R2P implementation and 
reflect further on the multi-dimensional relationship 
between principles and practices in this regard. The 
armed intervention in Libya changed several UN mem-
bers’ attitude towards R2P (Thakur, 2013), and the 
“norm contestation” (Wiener, 2008) that followed 
might help explain R2P advocates’ change of perspec-
tive, as discussed above—and perhaps a changed focus 
in implementation of certain aspects of the norm, ex-
amined below. Moreover, Libya has repeatedly been 
referred to as a(nother) failure for the EU, as it has 
been used to illustrate the Union’s inability to react to 
crises—especially by military means (Brattberg, 2011; 
Manon, 2011). This case is, therefore, selected for its 
potential to explain (1) if and how the EU has adopted, 
adapted, or rejected R2P, and (2) how R2P relates to 
EU practices of mass atrocity prevention during and af-
ter the Libya crisis.  
Political and academic discussions about R2P im-
plementation in Libya have typically employed a nar-
row understanding of implementation as a binary uni-
directional process and focused primarily on 
implementation within Pillar Three (Welsh, 2014). Our 
analysis of the EU’s reactive policies during and imme-
diately after the crisis will serve to illuminate less-
covered aspects of R2P’s three-pillar prescriptions and 
help us better understand if and how a “European 
practice towards mass atrocity prevention” is emerging 
through the EU. The structure of this contribution is as 
follows: first, we discuss the role of implementation in 
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norm development and diffusion more generally; 
thereafter, we focus on the implementation of R2P 
specifically. Here we study one in-depth case—EU re-
sponse to the 2011 Libyan crisis—taking into account 
all three pillars of R2P, but focusing on one segment 
thereof, namely, the Responsibility to React. The analy-
sis is based on a review of the existing literature, open 
source documentation, and some 30 semi-structured 
interviews with foreign affairs officials, experts and 
NGO representatives conducted by the authors in 
Brussels and Denmark between 2012 and 2015. 
2. Norm Implementation 
Despite having originally been developed to make 
sense of a complex and dynamic process, the theory of 
international norm diffusion (Finnemore & Sikkink, 
1998) has translated into a research agenda focusing 
more on norm acceptance and institutionalisation than 
on operational implementation (Betts & Orchard, 
2014). This is a problem, first, because norm ac-
ceptance is only an intermediate step towards internal-
isation, which means that the norm has acquired a tak-
en-for-granted character irrespective of the individual 
beliefs of leaders and officials (Risse & Sikkink, 1999; 
Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 2013). Second, such a focus ne-
glects that the process of norm internalisation is not a 
unidirectional progression from acceptance to compli-
ance, but rather a recursive negotiation of the meaning 
of that norm, which emerges especially when the norm 
is sought implemented. In relation to the norm’s life 
cycle, it has been argued that lack or partial implemen-
tation hinders “norm cascading” to other actors (Wie-
ner, 2008; Wiener & Puetter, 2009) and damages the 
external credibility of norm entrepreneurs (Widmaier 
& Grube, 2014). Research on norm “localisation”—
which refers to contexts “shaped by specific permeable 
and changeable normative orders” (Zimmerman, 2014, 
p. 2)—also suggests that norm adoption and rejection 
are not the only possible outcomes of norm diffusion 
(Acharya, 2004; Mac Ginty, 2011; Zwingel, 2012). If we 
focus on the process of internalisation that takes place 
within an organisation after it has formally accepted a 
norm (arguably the current state of R2P within the EU), 
then implementation can be seen as a recursive “writ-
ing” of the norm. Far from being a binary development 
leading to either compliance or non-compliance, im-
plementation is better understood as a process of ad-
aptation to the norm and/or of the norm. It may affect 
practices in more or less direct or visible ways, often 
depending on how explicit the reference to the norm 
is. However, it may also affect the very meaning at-
tached to the norm by the organisation implementing 
it, with possible repercussions for the institutional and 
international understanding of that norm. In fact, im-
plementation can become a field of contestation and 
explain why norms are sometimes understood differ-
ently across or indeed within international organisa-
tions. In the case of human rights, it has been argued: 
“different types of norm translation can be distin-
guished, most importantly reshaping or embedding” 
(Zimmermann, 2014, p. 2).4  
Krook and True (2012) argue that it is especially 
vague norms that enable “their content to be filled in 
many ways and thereby to be appropriated for a varie-
ty of different purposes” (Krook & True, 2012, p.104). 
In reality, a norm’s ambiguity is all but an objective 
evaluation and rather the result of negotiated mean-
ings. All norms possess a certain degree of “construc-
tive ambiguity” (Best, 2005; Widmaier & Grube, 2014), 
which may be exploited first by entrepreneurs to facili-
tate international acceptance and then by practitioners 
to guide or allow for (non)implementation. It is 
through implementation, indeed, that a norm acquires 
specificity and precision. But this is also when imple-
mentation may become blurry if different parts of the 
organisation implementing the norm have diverging in-
terests or understandings of what the norm means “in 
practice”.  
Betts and Orchard (2014) argue that implementa-
tion is “a parallel process to institutionalisation which 
draws attention to the steps necessary to introduce the 
new international norm’s precepts into formal legal 
and policy mechanisms within a state or organisation in 
order to routinise compliance” (Betts & Orchard, 2014, 
p. 1). They suggest that the “implementation process 
results in clear and observable standards, which may 
be the only clear indication that the norm has in fact 
been accepted” (Betts & Orchard, 2014, p. 4) and 
therefore used as “evidence of successful implementa-
tion which is transmitted back to the international level 
in order to monitor compliance with the norm” (Betts 
& Orchard, 2014, pp. 4-5).  
Following De Franco, Meyer and Smith (2015), we 
distinguish between three different forms of norm im-
plementation: programmatic, bureaucratic and opera-
tional. The first (programmatic implementation) refers 
to how speeches, statements and strategy documents 
produced by influential actors within an organisation 
promote a norm internally and externally. The second 
(bureaucratic implementation) accounts for how bu-
reaucratic structures and procedures of decision-
making and policy development respond to the norm. 
The third (operational implementation) refers to the 
norm’s mainstreaming into existing policies and re-
source allocation. As our focus is on reactive “practic-
es”, the following will mainly focus on operational im-
plementation, but when appropriate include speeches 
and statements that qualify as short-term program-
matic implementation in guidelines for further action 
(operational implementation), as illustrated in Table 1.  
However, these categories should not be taken as 
                                                          
4 Emphasis in original. 
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clear-cut categories of compliance to specific R2P pre-
scriptions. Such standards would inevitably reflect ex-
pectations about what the norm should mean in prac-
tice. This methodology would be appropriate if we had 
a binary understanding of implementation, but not as 
we approach implementation as the very process by 
which a norm is reified. In other words, if implementa-
tion is a specification and (re)interpretation of the 
norm, we cannot have pre-fixed standards of compli-
ance. Rather, (at least) part of this research should deal 
with the intrinsic challenge of finding a way to evaluate 
implementation. In this article, we have taken on this 
challenge by examining R2P as a framework structuring 
action through three pillars and four policy areas and 
relating this to the EU’s practices in a given case. The 
intention is not to determine causation between R2P 
and EU practices but to explore relations between (as-
pects of) the two. Table 1 illustrates how we methodo-
logically examine EU practices during the 2011 Libya 
crisis in relation to R2P. This approach is tailored to our 
specific case study and its limited focus on reactive 
practices. It could be developed further for future re-
search by including medium- and long-term program-
matic and bureaucratic implementation as well as the 
proposed responsibilities to prevent and rebuild. 
Table 1. Indicators of EU R2P implementation. 
1 Short-term 
programmatic 
implementation 
R2P (incl. three pillar 
structure and tool 
sequencing) promoted in 
speeches and statements 
delivered by influential EU 
actors reacting to 
developments in Libya and 
providing guidelines for 
further action 
2 Operational 
implementation 
R2P (incl. three pillar 
structure and tool 
sequencing) evident in 
political, economic, judicial 
and/or military practices 
(incl. policies and resource 
allocation) 
3. R2P Implementation 
Following the argument above, we focus on implemen-
tation to understand what R2P is developing into 
through related practices reacting to (expected or cur-
rent) mass atrocities. R2P presents some especially in-
teresting features illustrating how important and yet 
challenging the study of norm implementation is. First, 
R2P is an “emerging norm” (De Franco et al., 2015). 
There has been a series of efforts to operationalise R2P 
“both within the reasoning as well as the daily work of 
institutions…to build political support for the concept” 
(Vincent & Wouters, 2008, pp. 6-7). However, since the 
Libya crisis, to which we shall return, a “logic of con-
testedness” (Wiener & Puetter, 2009) has prevailed. 
This has in particular related to the international com-
munity’s remedial Responsibility to React, the focus of 
this enquiry, and to the fora through which this is im-
plemented. Second, R2P is a “principled norm” (Betts & 
Orchard, 2014), not creating precise legal obligations 
and therefore largely depending on implementation to 
become more specific and precise through practice and 
precedence. Third, R2P is a “complex norm” (Welsh, 
2014) containing more than one set of prescriptions, 
which “not only apply to different actors (in the case of 
Pillar One, national governments, and in the case of Pil-
lars Two and Three, to various international actors), 
but also exist at different levels of specificity” (Welsh, 
2014). This means that we can expect substantial varia-
tions in the degree and nature of implementation of 
different prescriptions and that one set of prescriptions 
therefore may become more heavily “weighted” in the 
overall understanding of the norm.  
Welsh (2014) rightly stresses that “whether or not 
military intervention occurs is not an appropriate “test” 
for effectiveness” (2014, p. 136); “R2P’s core function, 
as a norm, is to emphasise what is appropriate and to 
shine a spotlight on what is deemed inappropriate” 
(2014, p. 136). R2P is more similar to a “policy agenda” 
than a “rallying cry” for action (Bellamy in Welsh, 2014, 
p. 136). Thus, Welsh has argued, R2P’s strength should 
rather be measured “by the degree to which notions of 
protection are invoked by international actors during 
times of real or imminent crisis” (Welsh, 2014, p. 136) 
and how R2P serves “as a catalyst for debate” (Welsh, 
2014, p. 136). Therefore, “what the second and third 
pillars of R2P demand is a “duty of conduct” by mem-
bers of the international community: to identify when 
atrocity crimes are being committed (or when there is 
threat thereof) and to deliberate on how the three-
pillar framework might apply” (Welsh, 2014, p. 136). 
Welsh’s argument might certainly be influenced by her 
positive bias towards the norm in her position as UN 
Special Adviser for R2P, but it retains strength for our 
purposes in that it identifies challenges of “measuring” 
R2P implementation and offers some solutions to it. In 
the following, we examine empirically how R2P’s “duty 
of conduct”, as proposed by Welsh, relates to the EU’s 
reactive practices regarding Libya in 2011. This adds to 
our more nuanced take on R2P implementation, whilst 
we explore whether and how a “European practice of 
mass atrocity prevention” is emerging.  
4. Regional Agency and Mass Atrocity Prevention 
It is important to focus on regional agency—and that of 
the EU in particular—in relation to mass atrocity pre-
vention for a range of reasons. First, regional actors 
and arrangements are explicitly recognised in the UN 
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Charter (UN, 1945) as important to the maintenance of 
international peace and security and by the Interna-
tional Commission on Intervention and State Sover-
eignty (ICISS, 2001) as central to the implementation of 
R2P specifically. This accredits them legitimacy, author-
ity and responsibility in this regard. Second, regional 
organisations are becoming increasingly active in secu-
rity provision; thus, they enhance the range of tools 
and options available. Third and related, regional or-
ganisations increasingly shape the understanding of se-
curity challenges and frame responses to them in and 
beyond their respective regions (Dahl Thruelsen, 2009; 
Tavares, 2010). Fourth, it has been suggested that re-
gional organisations (can) translate international norms 
into regional responses to local problems (Dembinski & 
Reinold, 2011). Fifth, upon request from UN member 
states after NATO’s intervention in Libya, the UN Secre-
tary-General’s Report on “The Role of Regional and 
Sub-regional Arrangements in Implementing the Re-
sponsibility to Protect” discussed this issue specifically, 
albeit not devoid of ambiguities, which remain im-
portant to be considered below. Altogether this sug-
gests that studying regional dimensions of mass atroci-
ty prevention may illuminate how related norms like 
R2P are implemented and influential (or not).  
As a highly integrated and influential regional or-
ganisation in Europe, with a normative reach that in-
creasingly seeks to go beyond its borders, the EU is a 
potentially important regional organisation in this 
realm. Through the so-called “comprehensive ap-
proach” (CA), “effective multilateralism” (EU, 2003) 
and its substantial powers of attraction as well as pres-
sure and persuasion, the Union increasingly seeks to 
incorporate significant levels of normative conditionali-
ty in its external relations (Manners, 2006). This makes 
the EU a potential norm implementer/shaper outside 
as well as inside its borders; hence, its practices may 
matter to international norms and principles. Not sur-
prisingly, therefore, the EU has been perceived as a 
particularly suitable candidate for the implementation 
of mass atrocity prevention through R2P (Vincent & 
Wouters, 2008). Finally, as mass atrocities are under-
stood as the anti-thesis to development, the EU, as the 
world’s biggest aid donor is perceived as a key player in 
the nexus believed by some to exist between develop-
ment and mass atrocity prevention (Eggleston, 2014).  
5. The EU, R2P and Parallel Principles  
In 2003 the EU introduced an overarching principle to 
guide its crisis management activities: the so-called 
“comprehensive approach”. This appeared for the first 
time in the official framework for civil-military coopera-
tion (CMCO) (Council of the European Union, 2003), 
presented as the conceptual response to the “need for 
effective coordination of the actions of all relevant EU 
actors involved in the planning and subsequent imple-
mentation of EU’s response to the crisis” (Council of 
the European Union, 2003, p. 2). The European Com-
mission played a vital part in redefining the CA as a 
conflict-sensitive approach to development coopera-
tion (European Commission, 2011). The successive 
drafting of the Joint Communication on the EU’s Com-
prehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises re-
flected diverging conceptions dividing the European 
Commission and the Council. While the former has te-
naciously insisted on the need to respect development 
policy’s conventional neutrality, the latter has continu-
ously expressed concern that too strong a focus on po-
litical neutrality might lead to a failure to act strategi-
cally in the framework of the rebranded Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Pirozzi, 2013, p. 7).  
Meanwhile, the notion of “human security” has be-
come central to the development of EU security policy 
(Curran, 2015; Dembinski & Reinold, 2011; Gottwald, 
2012; Martin & Owen, 2010). As outlined by Martin and 
Owen (2010), not only did the Report on the Implemen-
tation of the European Security Strategy (ESS) (Council of 
the European Union, 2008) explicitly mention human se-
curity as a guiding principle of EU external action, it also 
drew “extensively, and in more detail than in previous 
texts, on human security ideas, affirming the importance 
of respect for human rights, and the gender dimension 
of security” (Martin & Owen, 2010, p. 217). In its draft-
ing the Council was reportedly influenced by then High 
Representative for European Foreign and Security Policy 
(EFSP), Javier Solana; by Finland, which during its 2006 
presidency of the EU commissioned a study on the Eu-
ropean Security and Defence Policy’s (ESDP) relation to 
human security; and by the European Parliament (Mar-
tin & Owen, 2010, p. 218). Hereafter, human security 
was mainstreamed especially by the European Commis-
sion into initiatives on human rights and policies on 
small arms and light weapons, non-proliferation, mine 
action and human trafficking. Following Martin and Ow-
en (2010), the EU’s implementation of human security 
specified the norm in a way that differed slightly from 
the UN’s original conception by combining “physical pro-
tection and material security, and situating it firmly with-
in a crisis management and a conflict resolution policy 
frame” (Martin & Owen, 2010, p. 219).  
Moreover, when the UN released its operational 
concept for “protection of civilians” (POC) in peace-
keeping operations in 2010, the EU not only welcomed 
but adopted it in its own Guidelines for Protection of 
Civilians in CSDP Missions and Operations. Like the UN, 
the EU conceptualised protection of civilians as a com-
prehensive and long-term effort by national and inter-
national actors in cooperation, combining military and 
non-military measures, not only providing direct pro-
tection from physical violence but also protection 
through political processes and establishment of pro-
tective environments, thus, seeking to address the root 
causes of threats to civilians. In this way, the EU’s op-
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erationalisation of POC highlighted human security 
concerns like protection of human rights, essential ser-
vices and resources in a stable, secure and just envi-
ronment as well as protection from physical violence 
and mass atrocities (De Benedictis, 2015). 
To some scholars (Dembinski & Reinold, 2011), the 
rise of human security in EU security culture and CSDP 
stated objectives can be explained by the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome (UN, 2005) and its adoption of R2P. 
After all, an official and explicit reference to R2P ap-
pears already in the EU’s 2005 Consensus on Develop-
ment (EU, 2005). Likewise, the 2008 report on the im-
plementation of the ESS links the two concepts by 
stressing the importance of human security, whilst at 
the same time recognising that “sovereign govern-
ments must take responsibility for the consequences of 
their actions and hold a shared responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleans-
ing and crimes against humanity” (Council of the Euro-
pean Union, 2008, p. 2).  
Surprisingly though, scholars have found the EU re-
luctant to mainstream the implementation of R2P (De 
Franco et al., 2015; Gottwald, 2012; Task Force on the 
EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities, 2013). Alongside a 
perceived lack of coordination of organs, instruments 
and policies, the EU has been accused of lacking a clear 
strategy (Coelmont, 2014), necessary capacities and 
political will to protect people outside its borders and 
prevent mass atrocities (Biscop, 2011). A similar view 
was expressed by NGO officials interviewed by the au-
thors in 2012 and 2013. This, despite the enhanced and 
increasingly formalised competencies of the EU High 
Representative/Vice President of the Commission and 
the European Union External Action Service, estab-
lished as the Lisbon Treaty initiated a number of 
changes intended to increase the Union’s shared will, 
ability, voice and engagement in external relations (EU, 
2008). Disparate initiatives continue to take place, but 
scholars and practitioners still seem to agree that the 
EU lacks political unity and strategic direction. As a re-
sult, its principles and practices related to mass atrocity 
prevention risk remaining un-coordinated at best and 
un-cooperative at worst—inside as well as outside the 
Union (De Baere, 2012; Dembinski & Reinold, 2011; 
Task Force on the EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities, 
2013; Vincent & Wouters, 2008).  
6. EU Reactions to the 2011 Libya Crisis 
In accordance with the UN Secretary-General’s 2011 
report, we accept that the EU’s “scope, capacity, and 
authority” constitutes potential for R2P implementa-
tion—also beyond the European region. Likewise, we 
agree that operational implementation of R2P would 
require preventive, responsive and reconstructive ac-
tions across the norm’s three-pillar structure, crosscut-
ting various policy areas. This could—as various EU rep-
resentatives have argued—correspond with the Union’s 
existing notion of human security and its comprehensive 
approach to crisis management (including conflict pre-
vention). In the following, we examine the EU’s actual 
reactions to the Libya crisis—including political, econom-
ic, judicial and military means—to assess the extent to 
which a “European practice of mass atrocity prevention” 
emerged in this case – and if so, how this related to R2P. 
In so doing, not only do we ascertain whether R2P was 
rejected or adopted as a full framework for action but 
we do also explain how R2P has been adapted to exist-
ing principles and practices of the EU.  
6.1. Short-Term Programmatic Implementation of R2P 
As the Libyan regime responded increasingly violently 
to the 2011 rebellion against it, the international com-
munity reacted by invoking R2P’s measure of “last re-
sort”. Security Council Resolution 1973 was historic in 
that for the first time the UN mandated forceful im-
plementation of R2P’s Third Pillar to protect a popula-
tion believed to be threatened by mass atrocities to be 
committed by its own government. The resolution au-
thorised “all necessary means” for their protection—
against the will of Libya’s leadership, which was subse-
quently removed by local rebel forces supported by in-
ternational use of force. The bombing campaign was 
initiated by a coalition of willing Western states, with 
France, the UK and a reluctant US in the lead, support-
ed by regional actors: the Arab League, United Arab 
Emirates and Qatar. NATO later took over the opera-
tion. Initially, the air campaign was relatively restricted, 
but as it went on, it became increasingly supportive of 
the rebels’ cause to oust Gadhafi, and with that it be-
came increasingly controversial around the world 
(Dembinski & Reinold, 2011). 
At the beginning of the crisis in February 2011, then 
High Representative Catherine Ashton condemned the 
repression of peaceful demonstrators and the violence 
against and death of civilians in Libya. She went on, in 
accordance with R2P Pillar One, to urge the Libyan au-
thorities to refrain from any further violence against 
the population. Shortly after, Council President Her-
man Van Rompuy acknowledged the EU’s own respon-
sibility, in accordance with Pillar Two, to support Libya 
and protect the Libyan population henceforth. To this 
end, he stated, “European leaders…acted with swift-
ness and determination, diplomatically…and militarily” 
(Van Rompuy, 2011b). Nevertheless, the EU was criti-
cised for its “slow and incoherent” response to the cri-
sis (Gottwald, 2012, p. 5). Gottwald (2012) questioned 
whether Van Rompuy was speaking of the EU at all in 
his reference to “European leaders”, and if so, whether 
his assessment was fair. Whether or not he was refer-
ring to the Union or to particular member states, Van 
Rompuy’s statement does demonstrate significant 
support within the EU at the time for R2P’s forceful 
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implementation, and that amongst its advocates was 
the then President of the Council. Not only did he 
stress that R2P was put into action with perseverance 
and success, but he added that there was “a responsi-
bility to assist the new Libya with the political transi-
tion, the reconciliation and the reconstruction of a 
united country” (Van Rompuy, 2011b).  
Critics have argued that the Union’s response to the 
crisis showed a gap between EU rhetoric and action 
(Gottwald, 2012). However, in diplomacy more gener-
ally and according to the R2P framework specifically, 
rhetoric is action. It is one diplomatic tool among 
many—a tool, which the EU repeatedly used in re-
sponse to the Libyan crisis—and as such an indicator of 
programmatic implementation of R2P, as defined 
above. Upon the adoption of Resolution 1973, Ashton 
and Van Rompuy (2011) declared that the EU was 
“ready to implement this resolution within its mandate 
and competencies”. This statement was supported by 
the Council, representing all 28 member states, which 
expressed its satisfaction with the resolution and “un-
derlined its determination to contribute to its imple-
mentation”. Van Rompuy (2011a) emphasised that “the 
European Council wants the safety of the Libyan people 
to be secured by all necessary measures”. The Council 
soon urged Gadhafi to relinquish power, and when the 
Libyan Contact Group recognised the National Transi-
tional Council (TNC) as the legitimate governing authori-
ty in Libya, the EU—itself a member of the Contact 
Group—supported that decision. Subsequently, both 
Van Rompuy and Ashton reminded the TNC of their re-
sponsibility, as the governing authority, to protect the 
citizens of Libya and reiterated the EU’s Responsibility to 
Assist them in this endeavour (Pillars One and Two).  
In other words, the EU as a whole committed itself 
explicitly to R2P in response to the Libya crisis. Alt-
hough there were significant disagreements in the 
wider international community as well as amongst EU 
member states about whose responsibility it was to do 
what and, thus, how R2P should be implemented, the 
Union’s member states did agree to voice their shared 
support: first, for the Libyan authorities’—initially 
Gadhafi and later the TNC—Responsibility to Protect all 
Libya’s people (Pillar One); second, the EU’s Responsi-
bility to Assist them in this (Pillar Two); and third, only 
in the last instance and upon the UN’s request and 
mandate for the international community to take over 
some of that responsibility (Pillar Three). Despite disa-
greements among the member states (cf. Germany’s 
abstention in the Security Council vote on Resolution 
1973), they did reach consensus in the Council and in 
effect upon the EU’s short-term programmatic imple-
mentation of R2P in reaction to the Libya crisis. 
6.2. Operational Implementation of R2P 
Despite significant disagreements along the way, the 
Union’s member states also agreed to launch a series 
of joint operational responses to the crisis. In March 
2011, the Union convened an Extraordinary Council 
meeting of European leaders in Brussels. At this emer-
gency meeting the Council called for Gadhafi’s resigna-
tion and welcomed the TNC in his place. Subsequently, 
the EU opened a liaison office in Benghazi in May and 
promised further support to the new Libyan authorities 
in border management and security reform, to the 
economic, health and education sectors as well as to 
the Libyan civil society (Gottwald, 2012).  
Field experts were deployed inside and on the bor-
ders of the country. Frontex Joint Operation Hermes 
2011 responded to Union concerns of increased migra-
tion flows following the crisis, although it failed to ac-
cept or promote any Responsibility to Protect these 
people. Nevertheless, while the Union was bringing 
some 5,800 EU citizens home from Libya, EU Commis-
sioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid 
and Crisis Response, Kristalina Georgieva, was one of 
many who reminded the EU of its Responsibility to Pro-
tect not only its own citizens but also the Libyan popu-
lation (Georgieva, 2011).  
In 2011 the Strategy for Security and Development 
in the Sahel had announced EUR24.5 million in EU as-
sistance to Libya, allocated under the European Devel-
opment Fund, Instrument for Stability, European 
Neighbourhood Policy Instrument, thematic pro-
grammes and budget lines. However, by October 2011 
the Commission and certain member states had pro-
vided over EUR152 million towards humanitarian aid 
and civil protection in the country (ECHO, 2011), illus-
trating the Union’s support for and use of non-coercive 
tools in reaction to the crisis. The EU also implemented 
a number of coercive sanctions. It adopted and helped 
enforce UN sanctions, including the arms embargo and 
targeted sanctions mandated by UN Security Council 
Resolution 1970 as well as the no-fly zone and exten-
sion of the asset freezes added in Resolution 1973. The 
Union added further sanctions of its own. Overall, 
some 40 individuals close to the regime, key financial 
entities, the National Oil Corporation and five of its 
subsidiaries, the port authorities, and 26 energy firms 
in Libya were targeted by EU sanctions (Koenig, 2011). 
The Union considered military responses as well, 
but favoured a UN mandate and hoped to support the 
delivery of humanitarian aid rather than actively en-
gaging in the armed conflict. In April 2011, the EU re-
sponded to a request from the UN Office for the Coor-
dination of Humanitarian Affairs and declared itself 
ready to deploy up to 1,000 personnel to facilitate safe 
movement and possible evacuation of internally dis-
placed people and assist humanitarian aid access in 
Libya. HR Ashton clearly stated that this mission was 
“unlikely” to be deployed, but she argued that if it was 
requested, it should be ready; hence, she said at the 
time, planning was initiated (Al Jazeera, 2011). Particu-
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larly relevant to our analysis, is the fact that all EU 
member states supported the HR’s initiation of the op-
erational planning process, although they disagreed 
profoundly on how such a response should be imple-
mented. For example, Sweden and Finland, both mem-
bers of the Nordic Battle Group, rejected the idea of its 
deployment. Meanwhile, UN humanitarian chief, Va-
lerie Amos, expressed concern that the proposed EU 
force (EUFOR) “blurred lines” between military and 
humanitarian action and stressed that it should only be 
called upon as a last resort. In the end, EUFOR Libya 
was not deployed, as the UN never requested it.  
Interviews conducted with EU officials between 
2012 and 2013 revealed an organisational culture an-
chored in a “civilian power” Europe ideal, deeply un-
comfortable with forcible humanitarian intervention. 
Interviewees also stressed that the EU has no legal ba-
sis for initiating military operations and is heavily de-
pendent on member states’ willingness to mobilise re-
sources, particularly the few countries with an 
expeditionary model and means of foreign policy. 
However, the argument most interviewees put forward 
was that if the “desired outcome is saving lives” then a 
forcible military intervention might not be the best op-
tion. Naturally, variations occurred across interviews 
with respondents from different parts of the EU sys-
tem. While officials from the EU Military Staff did not 
exclude Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO)5 in 
principle—they suggested that the Petersberg tasks 
(incl. peace-enforcement) in fact include MARO. Offi-
cials from DG DEVCO, the development agency of the 
European Commission, stressed rather the importance 
of non-coercive measures for both prevention of and 
reaction to mass atrocities.  
Overall, in response to this crisis the Union repeat-
edly stressed the Libyan authorities’ protection respon-
sibilities—first to Gadhafi and later to the TNC. It rec-
ognised its own responsibilities in this regard too. EU 
reactions to the crisis ranged across the three pillars 
and from political and economic measures to consider-
ing military options and humanitarian assistance. This 
indicates a clear correlation, albeit not necessarily cau-
sation, between the R2P norm, framework and tools, 
on the one hand, and the Union’s response to the Liby-
an crisis, on the other—suggesting that the two may 
indeed have been mutually reinforcing. The EU explicit-
ly supported Pillar One, Two and Three responsibilities 
to protect the Libyan population in various political 
statements and operational activities, which indicates 
the Union’s support for the R2P framework as a whole 
as well as its component parts. There is evidence of 
short-term programmatic implementation as well as 
operational norm implementation, which indicates that 
                                                          
5 MARO operations are a doctrinal concept that is detailed in 
Appendix B to the US Department of Defence Joint Publication 
on Peace Operations (DOD, 2012).  
in this case existing scholarly interpretations of EU R2P 
implementation are too simplistic. It is worth noting, 
however, that the EU approach to Pillar Three also in 
this case seems to emphasise humanitarian assistance 
and capacity building within the existing crisis man-
agement framework, in continuity with the EU’s nor-
mative agenda on human security, as described by 
Martin and Owen (2010), rather than more main-
stream interpretations of what R2P’s Pillar Three 
should entail. In particular, according to officials from 
the EEAS multilateral relation division, the Libya crisis 
revealed different interpretations of Pillar Three 
among member states and substantial resistance to 
R2P’s limitations to state sovereignty emerged.6 Never-
theless, this did not amount to a rejection of R2P alto-
gether nor to absence of joint EU reactions to the crisis 
in Libya—rather it seemed to shape the nature of the 
two. As argued above—norm implementation is not 
simply an either-or question—instead we proposed an 
alternative approach, which allows for and recognises 
nuanced implementation or weighting of various as-
pects of a norm. It makes better analytical sense, we 
suggest, to thoroughly examine relations between 
norms and practices, in our case between R2P and EU 
crisis response in Libya, than to get stuck in chicken-or-
egg discussions considering correlation vs. causation 
which does not allow for parallel principles and prac-
tices to co-exist. 
7. The EU’s Parallel Protection Principles and Practices 
after Libya 
Having to face another crisis in Mali shortly after the 
Libya crisis—and partly as a consequence thereof—the 
EU reconsidered its approach to crisis management 
and civilian protection. In 2013 the EU Military Com-
mittee deemed it necessary to develop a military con-
cept for “POC in EU-led Military Operations”, adopted 
in March 2015. Although its focus was notably on POC 
rather than R2P, the concept illustrates continued at-
tention to and focus on protection in EU external ac-
tion. The Union’s operationalisation of POC thus runs 
parallel to the R2P framework, but reveals a continued 
EU acceptance of and preoccupation with its own re-
sponsibility in this regard—if now by another name (De 
Benedictis, 2015).  
Our interviewees confirm increased attention to 
mass atrocity prevention after the Libya crisis. Intelli-
gence officials at the EU Intelligence Centre, in particu-
lar, reported being explicitly “tasked” to monitor risks 
of mass atrocities in Libya in 2012. Likewise, the draft-
ing of the Joint Communication on the EU’s Compre-
hensive Approach was given new impulse. The docu-
ment—released in December 2013—does not mention 
R2P explicitly but arguably integrates parts of the R2P 
                                                          
6 Interviews conducted in Brussels in June 2012. 
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framework into the CA. It expands the CA’s scope to in-
clude all “stages of the conflict cycle” (European Com-
mission & High Representative of CFSP, 2013, p. 2), in-
cluding those of conflict prevention and sustainable 
long-term development, and strengthens the connection 
between security and development, also at the core of 
the EU’s initial interpretation of R2P. This too indicates 
an overall normative agenda seeking to incorporate and 
integrate parallel principles in practice. 
The practical inter-relationship between human se-
curity, POC, R2P and CA became apparent with the first 
implementation of CA after its formalisation; that is, in 
EU reactions to the Mali crisis. To operationalise the 
CA, the EU Delegation in Bamako received a short-term 
stabilisation package of EUR20 million through the In-
strument for Stability, primarily intended to support 
the “protection of civilians” (European Commission, 
2013) by helping the “Malian local authorities, to re-
establish the presence of the State” (European Com-
mission, 2013), indicating continued—and preferred—
EU support for what in R2P terms are Pillars One and 
Two, as one might have expected from the findings 
above regarding EU implementation of R2P. 
8. Conclusions 
This article shows how the 2011 Libya crisis in many 
ways was a revealing moment for EU practices of 
mass atrocity prevention. During the crisis, the EU 
operationalised R2P, incorporating its own interpreta-
tion of the emerging norm while integrating it into its 
existing security cultures, structures and policies. The 
EU did this by adapting R2P to its own needs, tradi-
tions and interests. Thus, we take issue with those 
observers who suggested that the Libya intervention 
strengthened the hand of those within the EU pushing 
for more forceful interpretations of the norm 
(Dembinski & Reinold, 2011), as well as with those 
who argued it may have broken the EU consensus on 
R2P altogether (Brockmeier, Jurtz, & Junk, 2014). Our 
findings show rather how the EU has consistently con-
flated parallel principles like R2P and POC with its 
comprehensive approach in a way that is consistent 
with its original approach to human security. That is, 
as part of its development policy and crisis manage-
ment activities.  
While the use of the human security label has de-
clined, as R2P is now also doing, the way in which R2P 
was implemented in Libya and the comprehensive 
approach was formalised to incorporate POC thereaf-
ter shows both adoption and adaptation of R2P. Ref-
erence to the three-pillar structure is explicit, contin-
uous and apparent, whilst the EU emphasises its 
responsibility to assist—particularly in preventing and 
rebuilding, while limiting its considerations regarding 
the use of the military to crisis management—and 
particularly humanitarian and technical assistance to 
fragile states and populations. So, R2P’s duty of con-
duct was adopted in the Libya case, but R2P was at 
the same time adapted to the Union’s existing norma-
tive agenda and integrated into the development of 
the comprehensive approach to conflict and crisis, 
now including protection of civilians. Different organs 
and representatives of the EU remain sceptical about 
the added value of an “R2P lens”—not to mention la-
bel—to their ongoing work (De Franco et al., 2015; 
Task Force on the EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities, 
2013). However, R2P has influenced EU crisis re-
sponse, civilian protection and early warning in and 
beyond Libya, even if an explicit reference to R2P has 
become ever more problematic because of the in-
creasing norm contestation after that crisis.  
In sum, we show how the conflation of R2P with 
related principles and practices has placed most of 
the norm’s “weight” on the first two pillars. This is 
where there has been a wider and stronger consensus 
among EU institutions and member states since 2005 
and still in 2015. In so doing, the EU is contributing (a) 
to what we propose is a changing conception of the 
R2P norm, which no longer constitutes the same chal-
lenge to traditional notions of sovereignty, and (b) 
therefore to (European) practices of mass atrocity 
prevention that are still state- rather than human 
rights-centred and integrated into development poli-
cies and crisis management missions rather than hu-
manitarian interventions.  
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